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Lonely Libertarian: One Man's View of
Antidiscrimination Law
LEA BRILMAYER*
In his recent book, Professor Richard Epstein attacks antidis-
crimination law from three different philosophical points of view:
utilitarian, libertarian, and freedom of contract. None of these ar-
guments is compelling as applied to a legal regime as popular as
Epstein admits core antidiscrimination law to be. Epstein's cri-
tique of antidiscrimination law rests on a belief that our prefer-
ences not to discriminate or to be discriminated against - our
tastes for nondiscrimination - are silly, a belief that is flatly in-
consistent with the subjective preference orientation that Epstein
uses to defend the taste to discriminate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Some people would be dismayed to find their ideas almost univer-
sally rejected, but not Richard Epstein. Epstein relishes the opportu-
nity to challenge intellectual taboos, to defend the counterintuitive
- indeed the unthinkable. This puts his critics at something of a
motivational disadvantage. What psychological satisfaction can you
possibly get from standing up courageously for something generally
taken to be obvious? Where is the romance? Where is the thrill?
Who wants to play Goliath to Epstein's David? Why, in other words,
* The author wishes to thank Chris Eisgruber, Rip Verkerke, and J.P. Benoit for
their comments. John Donohue has made many of these same observations in a more
developed form, in an article that was published just after the completion of the first
draft of this article; I wish especially to thank him for sharing his reactions to this piece
and to draw attention to his excellent review of the Epstein book. John J. Donohue III,
Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1583 (1992) (book review).
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would you want to waste your energy showing that antidiscrimina-
tion law can be defended? 1
Epstein scoffs at the notion that being in the majority - indeed,
in the vast majority - lends credibility to one's views. 2 And it is
true in many situations that spouting received wisdom demonstrates
nothing more than mindless conformity. The desirability of antidis-
crimination law, however, is not such a situation. While academics
almost universally approve of Title VII,3 approval is not limited to
the academic community, nor even to the community of professional
politicians. As Epstein himself clearly recognizes, the core antidis-
crimination principle - prohibition of disparate treatment - is very
widely accepted in the public at large.4 My argument here is that
this far-reaching popular acceptance (as contrasted with the nar-
rower intellectual acceptance in the academic community) provides a
strong argument on behalf of Title VII.
Now, one might argue that substantive popularity is adequate ba-
sis for statutory policy if one were a simplistic majoritarian democrat
- such a simplistic democrat would argue that the fact that the
majority wants antidiscrimination law is enough to show that it is
justifiable. That is not my argument. It is clear that Epstein is not a
simplistic majoritarian democrat, and neither am I. The argument
that overwhelming consensus counts as a good reason for antidis-
crimination law is grounded, instead, on philosophical premises that
Epstein himself should find more intellectually congenial, premises
that figure in his unstinting rejection of antidiscrimination policy.
Unfortunately, it is not completely clear which philosophical prem-
ises Epstein himself adopts; for this reason we will examine three
different positions which figure at different times into his critique of
antidiscrimination law. They are utilitarian, libertarian, and freedom
1. It is unclear whether Epstein's claim is simply that antidiscrimination law is
morally and politically unjustified, or whether he is also claiming that it is unconstitu-
tional. While most of the discussion in his book concerns political morality, his discussion
of (for instance) Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), also suggests that he would
invalidate much legislation on constitutional grounds. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 99 (1992) [hereinafter FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS]. I plan to focus primarily on the political morality arguments, which seems
also to be the main focus of Epstein's arguments.
2. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 6.
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1993). I focus mainly on Title VII for purposes of illus-
tration; many (but not all) of my arguments would apply to other antidiscrimination
laws. The focus on Title VII is justified because it is the statute that Epstein himself
addresses at greatest length. I should also emphasize that it is not the fine points of Title
VII that I am addressing - whether Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989), was correctly decided, for instance. I mean to address the basic issue of whether
it is justifiable generally to have statutes that are designed to reduce or remedy
discrimination.
4. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 1.
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of contract arguments. While it is unclear which one of these is Ep-
stein's major foundation, none of them really supports the conclusion
he reaches in a situation where the vast majority of citizens prefer to
have a law prohibiting discrimination.
So Epstein's argument should really be addressed to the popula-
tion at large, not to politicians, academics, or judges. As long as the
general population remains convinced that Title VII and like-minded
statutes are beneficial, the fact that some academics (or, even, all
academics) find this view misguided is of little consequence. It is
possible that Forbidden Grounds will be a runaway best seller, and
will convince large numbers of Americans that our antidiscrimina-
tion laws are unjust and inefficient. It is hard to say.5 I am waiting
until then to undertake the somewhat harder job (but still, I think, a
worthwhile and manageable one) of convincing Americans that they
should want to have a law like Title VII, and of justifying adopting
such a law when there is not such nearly universal approval.
II. THREE CRITIQUES OF TITLE VII
To explain the significance of the far-reaching consensus on Title
VII, we need first to identify the foundation for Epstein's critique.
There are three themes: utilitarianism, libertarianism, and freedom
of contract. At most points, these three fit together reasonably well
in Epstein's broad assault on Title VII, and Epstein does not differ-
entiate between them (indeed, he relies selectively on all three, as
suits his immediate purpose.) But these are in theory different philo-
sophical foundations, and the significance of consensus varies de-
pending upon which theory is at issue.
The first basis for criticism is utilitarian. Epstein's complaint
against Title VII seems at times to be that it is inefficient in the
Kaldor-Hicks sense.' The goal of utilitarianism is to maximize the
total amount of benefit ("utility") to society at large, without regard
to distributional concerns. Epstein sounds the utilitarian theme when
(for instance) he describes how costly Title VII is, how much litiga-
tion it encourages, and so forth. These considerations would not be
5. Judging by the most recent New York Times best seller lists, it seems that the
book's chances would be greatly improved with a different subtitle, such as "Forbidden
Grounds: How To Satisfy a Woman Every Time" or "Forbidden Grounds: The True
Story of Princess Diana."
6. An arrangement is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if there is no alternative that is
Kaldor-Hicks superior to it. An arrangement is Kaldor-Hicks superior to another if mov-
ing to it generates enough benefit that, in theory, the winners could adequately compen-
sate the losers.
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relevant under a libertarian or freedom of contract philosophy, for
judicial activism to promote libertarian or freedom of contract objec-
tives would also (for instance) encourage costly litigation. Further-
more, at times Epstein seems explicitly to suggest that government
action is justified when it promotes overall utility.7 Utilitarianism is
a consequentialist theory (it judges actions in terms of the conse-
quences that they bring about); in this respect it differs from both
libertarian and freedom of contract approaches, which focus on
rights.
The second is libertarian. "Libertarian" is the philosophical cate-
gory in which Epstein seems to feel most at home; he frequently re-
fers to his position as a libertarian one.8 (He does not, to my
knowledge, refer to his position as "utilitarian", although as I argue,
some of his positions have a utilitarian cast.) 9 This characterization
fits in many respects. He is generally skeptical, for one thing, about
the merits of governmental intervention - utilitarians, in contrast,
have nothing against governmental regulation, per se, unless it di-
minishes utility. The early utilitarians, in fact, were not opposed to
using governmental power as a tool of social engineering. 10 In addi-
tion, libertarian arguments are relatively indifferent to consequences,
and Epstein's concern for the consequences of his proposed policies is
intermittent and easily distracted.
What, then, does the "libertarian" position consist of? There are
many possible definitions, but the one that captures Epstein's fancy
is that governmental intervention is permissible only to prevent and
punish force or fraud.1 The government is advised to depart from
the apocryphal "state of nature" as little as possible. The best known
modern libertarian, of course, is Robert Nozick, who argues that the
only government that is justified is the minimalist "night watchman"
state. 2
Living in a state of nature is unsatisfactory, under the libertarian
view, only because one's life plans are always in danger of being
upset by theft, murder, rape, and other sorts of mayhem. While Ep-
stein says little about why fraud is a special problem to be singled
out for special treatment, presumably the reason is that it is a kind
7. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 12, 24, 86-87, 91, 105.
8. Id. at 19, 503, 505.
9. I have not read all of Epstein's work. There are many things that I am willing
to take on as the price of admission to an interesting symposium. Minutely examining
Richard Epstein's corpus is not one of them.
10. Indeed, even Adam Smith seems not to have been a libertarian in the sense
that Epstein apparently contemplates. See Sylvia Nasar, Adam Smith Was No Gordon
Gekko, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1994, at E6 (Adam Smith not opposed on principle to using
government taxation to redistribute income).
11. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 104-05.
12. ROBERT NozICK. ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
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of "theft over time." Fraud permits one party to take the other's
property under false pretenses; when the defrauding party fails to
live up to his or her promises, a voluntary grant of property is retro-
actively transformed into an involuntary one. We will return later to
the question 6f why Epstein's list is as short as it is.
The third position is one of freedom of contract. Epstein clearly
aligns himself with the freedom of contract perspective. Just as Ep-
stein does not explicitly acknowledge the differences between the
utilitarian and libertarian arguments, he also does not discuss how
libertarianism and freedom of contract might diverge. They do, al-
though the difference between these two is more subtle than the well
known libertarian/utilitarian divide. First, notice that when Epstein
offers a definition of libertarianism, he approves government inter-
vention only to prevent force and fraud. Government intervention to
enforce contracts is not on the list.
Now one might think that contract enforcement is subsumed
under the category of preventing and penalizing fraud. But as teach-
ers of torts and contracts know, contract and fraud are rather differ-
ent causes of action. Without going too deeply into the specific
elements that should constitute a cause of action for fraud it is clear
that there are some contract actions that do not involve fraud at all.
Assume that a seller of goods enters into a contract with all inten-
tions of performing, but finds out shortly after the contract has been
signed that she will be unable to perform, and notifies the buyer
before the buyer has had any chance to rely. Where's the fraud?
Rather than attempt to stretch the category to include all contract
actions, Epstein would do better simply to amend his list of justifia-
ble governmental actions to include contracts enforcement.
This would be easy enough for him to do; so let us assume that he
agrees to this. Has this in any way changed the "libertarian" nature
of his argument? There is a slight shift in emphasis, for libertarian-
ism now includes more of an emphasis on positive rights against the
government, rather than merely negative rights to be left alone. This
is a point on which the basic thrusts of libertarianism and freedom of
contract diverge. The libertarian focus is on keeping the government
as close as possible to the state of nature; a violation of rights occurs
when the government intervenes without adequate justification. The
freedom of contract position, in contrast, imposes upon the govern-
ment the obligation to step in and enforce contracts that have been
made. Citizens, then, have a good complaint in at least some in-
stances of governmental inaction.
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Libertarians, admittedly, might have cause for complaint in cer-
tain instances of governmental inaction; where the government, for
instance, declined to adopt laws penalizing murder. In that sense a
libertarian might recognize positive rights against the government.
But it is not clear that a libertarian necessarily recognizes affirma-
tive rights of this sort; for this would compel the government to pro-
hibit every action that it was entitled to prohibit. It would have, in
other words, to exercise all of the power that it had; it would have no
discretion to penalize anything off the list, and no discretion not to
penalize anything on the list. And even if some libertarians were to
acknowledge such positive rights against the government, Epstein
has not recognized such rights, focusing instead on the outer limits
of what a state may do. His focus seems to be on negative rights, in
other words.
In contrast, freedom of contract seems to entail some affirmative
rights - that the government enforce the contracts one enters into.
(Perhaps freedom of contract might be interpreted to mean only that
the government should not intervene with private enforcement mech-
anisms, but this seems unlikely given the well-known failure of pri-
vate enforcement mechanisms in many cases.) This point raises the
interesting question of what Epstein would say about an antidis-
crimination law which took the form of a simple governmental decla-
ration that discriminatory contracts would not be enforceable. This
is a strategy that has been adopted with other sorts of contracts
thought contrary to public policy, such as usurious contracts, or
prostitution or gambling contracts. A black tenant, for instance,
might be granted the right to invalidate his lease if he found out that
he had been offered less advantageous terms than a similarly situ-
ated white tenant. A libertarian, it seems, would have no objection to
such a law - a freedom of contract proponent apparently would. 13
The final difference between the libertarian and freedom of con-
tract position is simply that freedom of contract, by itself, is not the
complete political philosophy that libertarianism is. On most issues,
it takes no position. The freedom of contract theorist would put up
with many sorts of government regulation that would offend a liber-
tarian, so long as they did not interfere with consensual contractual
relations. A criminal prohibition on expressing politically incorrect
opinions would be of no concern to the free contract proponent;
neither would extensive taxation to redistribute wealth. 14 In this
13. Such a law would probably bother Epstein for all of the reasons that he raises
against more traditional sorts of discrimination laws - it would (arguably) hurt minori-
ties more than it helped them, it would cause litigation, etc. - and thus one expects that
Epstein would oppose it. But this is only a guess.
14. Note that at one point Epstein suggests that taxation and wealth redistribution
would be a better approach than antidiscrimination law. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra
HeinOnline  -- 31 San Diego L. Rev. 110 1994
[VOL. 31: 105. 1994] Lonely Libertarian: One Man's View
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
sense, freedom of contract is a much less restrictive theory than lib-
ertarianism, for all that it really rules out is contract interference
while the libertarian theory rules out a large variety of other govern-
mental measures.
These three philosophical theories fit fairly well together in the
following sense; all are generally quite skeptical about interference
with private markets. Indeed, Epstein acknowledges his general in-
debtedness to economic theory, which (depending on which version
one adopts) might take on either utilitarian, libertarian, or freedom
of contract coloration.15 Libertarian theory is hostile to market inter-
ventions for the same reason that it is hostile to virtually all other
forms of governmental regulation: only force and fraud justify state
coercion. Freedom of contract theory is more selective: market inter-
ventions are uniquely evil because they interfere with consensual
agreements. Utilitarian theory is suspicious of most market interven-
tions because consensual agreements are generally utility enhanc-
ing.' All three theories seem poised to descend simultaneously on
government efforts to interfere with private transactions.
With all of the philosophical heavy artillery that Epstein wheels
into action and trains on Title VII, it is no wonder that the poor
little statute appears so bedraggled by the end of the book. One is
led to wonder whether it is fair to require that our antidiscrimination
laws satisfy every conceivable political theory one might imagine.
Epstein switches opportunistically from one high powered weapon to
another, depending on which side of the target seems more vulnera-
ble. Other authors equally suspicious of do-gooder legislation (Rich-
ard Posner and Robert Nozick come to mind) show a little more
note 1, at 12. This raises the question whether Epstein can really call himself a liberta-
rian. One also wonders whether, if those avenues had been chosen instead of the antidis-
crimination strategy, an equally convincing (!) book might not have been written from
the libertarian point of view criticizing this choice of strategy. Note that if one believes
Epstein, such redistributive measures could not be implemented as a matter of corrective
justice alone, because the wrong party is being compensated; thus if he really believes
that these measures are justifiable, he cannot really be a libertarian.
15. Id. at 7 (proposing an evaluation based on economic theory).
16. Note that utilitarianism does not limit its consideration to individuals who are
parties to the transaction, as Epstein sometimes seems to. See, e.g., id. at 149, 415 (con-
tract is the business only of the parties to it). In fact, a utilitarian would invalidate any
contract which imposed greater costs than benefits on the world at large. Furthermore,
the costs need not be of the "force or fraud" variety that libertarianism focuses on; if it
caused me great psychological pain that the University of Chicago Law School be sold to
a developer who planned to tear it down and put up a Kentucky Fried Chicken, this pain
would have to be taken into account. Utilitarianism leads to the same result as freedom
of contract, however, when no one other than the contracting parties has any interests at
stake - although it does so for very different reasons.
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respect for the Marquis of Queensbury's rules; they are willing to
limit themselves to a single theoretical weapon before setting off on
the hunt. In assessing Epstein's philosophical argument, it would be
nice to know which one he is making.
But maybe his claim would be that no matter what theory one
uses, Title VII still comes up lacking. It flunks every test. If that is
the argument, one tends to wonder how the statute ever happened to
get enacted - and why it has not since been repealed. How could a
piece of legislation have so many defects and still be so popular? My
argument in this article is that the general popularity of the core
antidiscrimination principle - the prohibition on disparate treat-
ment - casts doubt on Epstein's belief that discrimination law actu-
ally flunks these three theories. We will argue in just a moment for
the relevance of popular consensus to these philosophical theories,
but first we might pause to ask why, in fact, antidiscrimination
norms have such far-reaching popular support.
III. WHY IS TITLE VII SO POPULAR?
Epstein complains that the positive case for Title VII law has
never been made; it is (he says) simply assumed.17 As we will see at
several points below, the fact that he finds this cause for complaint
coexists somewhat nervously with his simultaneously-held belief that
people are entitled to hold whatever preferences they choose, without
justifying them to academics.18 Here I wish only to argue that it is
rational to prefer equality, not that any other position is outra-
geous.1 9 Given the importance of antidiscrimination policy, the
rather breezy arguments below are undoubtedly quite superficial; but
that is probably appropriate under the circumstances.
Imagine that you are considering permanently leaving the United
States, and there are two places to which you might emigrate. They
have comparable climates, natural resources, and other attractions.
The main difference between the two is in the way race relations are
treated.20 Both countries have rich people and poor people (in ap-
proximately equal numbers), but in state A there is no particular
correlation between economic situation and ethnic identity while in
state Z economic position is tremendously stratified along racial
17. Id. at 7.
18. See, e.g., id. at 75, 151. He apparently believes that one need not justify a
preference to live, work, or study with people just like oneself, but that one needs to
justify a preference for integration or equality.
19. On the question whether other positions are morally outrageous, I reserve my
opinion for another forum.
20. Here I focus specifically on race relations, although the argument could also be
framed in terms of other protected groups. I focus on race relations simply for purposes
of simplicity of exposition.
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lines. There is also a great deal more racial segregation in Z than in
A, in business, religious institutions, private schools, residential ar-
eas, and so forth. More than a proportionate amount of crime is
committed by certain ethnic group members in Z, and the victims of
crime are disproportionately from the same ethnic groups. The jails
are full of those group members in Z, while the universities are not.
Life expectancy, infant mortality, and other health care indicators
vary across racial lines. In A, in contrast, one's membership in a
racial group is not predictive of much of anything.
Would it be absolutely nutty to take this difference into account in
making one's choice between moving to A and moving to Z? I sus-
pect that most Americans would find the difference a plausible rea-
son for favoring A; this could well be true for members of the
dominant ethnic group as well as for members of the disadvantaged
group. One might, no doubt, look at Z and worry that somewhere
down the line some version of Sarajevo (or Los Angeles or Crown
Heights) was looming. One might be favorably impressed with the
fact that you would have a much larger group of potential friends
and acquaintances in A (where practical barriers to interracial mix-
ing do not exist) than in Z. One might even find A to be a (pardon
the expression) morally better society in which to bring up one's chil-
dren.2' One might expect that there would be economic advantages
to having all children grow up with the expectations that all careers
are open to people from both races, so that they can safely make the
investment in an education. 2 I could list many other assumptions
that one might be forgiven for making. I think that these are enough
to suggest that the preference for A over Z is within the outer
bounds of rationality.
There are two responses that Epstein might make to this compari-
son. First, he might argue it is impossible that a society such as A
could exist that would compare favorably with Z on economic terms;
equality is necessarily achieved at the expense of utility. Second, he
might argue that while one might be acting rationally in choosing A
over Z, that is not the choice we are now faced with. We live in Z
(or something like it), and the question is whether it is possible or
practical to try to turn our society into A.
21. Epstein, oddly, does not discuss personal morality at any place in his book.
This makes me wonder whether the subject is not, for some reason, off limits, but since I
cannot see why it should be I bring it up, although with some trepidation.
22. Epstein recognizes that division of sex roles may affect what career choices
individuals may want to make investments in. See, e.g., FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra
note 1, at 270.
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The argument that A could simply not exist on an economic par
with Z would be based on his claim that there are efficiency gains to
segregation along racial lines. Epstein claims that it is not surprising
that we like to work (or live, or whatever) with people who are like
us.23 I will admit that there is some validity to this argument, if he
states the point that way. Not being a cigarette smoker, I find it very
hard to conceive that I would want to share an office with one. I
believe that segregating offices along such lines is probably efficient.
But I do not feel that way about sharing an office with someone from
a different religion. Epstein's mistake is to assume that when we
think that we want to be with people who are "like" us, that "like-
ness" is unavoidably defined on racial lines. Stated this way, the
point is far less plausible. It is hard to imagine that the people of A
would somehow experience efficiency gains if they could somehow
manage to segregate along racial lines. Racial segregation supplies
no efficiency gains unless "being with people like you" means "being
with people of your own racial group" and, in a society like A, it
would not have that meaning.24
Much of the support for antidiscrimination law probably comes
from the sense that, in the long run, racial differences would not
matter the way (say) cigarette smoking does.25 To the extent that we
now sometimes feel uncomfortable in cross-racial situations, accord-
ing to this view, that discomfort is an artifact of our unfamiliarity
and little more. In A, we would no more be concerned about ethnic-
ity than many other interesting and important facts about people
that make them who they are - family background, previous life
experiences, tastes, and religious convictions, for example - that do
not disqualify them as potential neighbors, roommates, or colleagues.
Would we be more efficient if our workplaces were segregated by
height? Only if height somehow had something to do with job per-
formance. And the same is true for "invidious" discriminations.
Nowhere in his book does Epstein discuss the costs that come with
ethnic divisions. It is somewhat astonishing that this book could so
cavalierly advocate allowing racial segregation without ever mention-
ing the possibility of strife. Presumably, Epstein would say that the
government must wait until ethnic warfare breaks out, and then step
in on the grounds that the state is entitled to protect against "force
23. Id. at 45-46.
24. Conceivably, Epstein could argue that it is biologically determined that we will
define "likeness" on racial lines. A, in other words, could not exist in the form I describe.
25. Indeed, some would probably criticize the liberal vision underlying civil rights
law for precisely this reason. My argument may sound suspiciously like "add women and
stir," but in fact it is not. For my picture of A assumes that all groups have an equal part
in determining the nature of the society.
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and fraud."2 Epstein's confidence in the innocuousness of racial seg-
regation has a somewhat macabre tone in light of the international
reporting currently dominating our newspapers - Somalia and Yu-
goslavia are tyro examples, but they could easily be multiplied. One
is tempted to say that under this approach to race relations, the only
real problem with "ethnic cleansing" is that the ends do not justify
the means.
Perhaps Epstein would not argue that no sane person could prefer
A over Z, or that there is no way A could be as economically well off
as Z. Instead he might raise the question of difficulties in making the
transition. If our current society resembles Z, perhaps it is either
impossible or impractical to make the transition to A. (We will ex-
amine below the question whether the transition might be impermis-
sible for other reasons, such as rights violations.) The claim that it is
genuinely impossible to make the transition seems implausible. Per-
haps one might argue that once a society becomes racially polarized,
racial identifications come to assume such importance that they can
never be erased. One is entitled to doubt such a strong claim, how-
ever, and therefore to act on the opposite assumption. Some issues
that previously divided us today assume much less importance -
there was once much greater prejudice against Catholics, for in-
stance. Prejudice against Asians is definitely less than it was one
hundred years ago. Intermarriage is both a piece of evidence and a
possible explanation, but greater familiarity with persons from dif-
ferent races is another factor.
The claim that greater familiarity will, over time, break down bar-
riers seems at first to resemble an argument that Epstein rejects,
namely the idea that tastes will change and that through social engi-
neering the government can encourage such change. 7 Here, Epstein
acknowledges that tastes do change - we no longer think that flight
attendants should all be cute young things in flashy outfits - but
asserts that it is not for the government to determine which tastes we
should have.28 Whatever one thinks of this argument about the sanc-
tity of private preferences, though, it is beside the present point. The
question is whether it is rational of the proponents of antidiscrimina-
tion law to think that their own tastes will change over time, given
26. But note that he thinks, in other contexts, that it is reasonable to take preemp-
tive or prophylactic measures. See, e.g., FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 105 (pro-
phylactic rules justified where case-by-case enforcement is costly).
27. He rejects this argument. Id. at 304.
28. Id. at 305-06.
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that they want their tastes to come to reflect their judgments that A
is superior to Z. There seems to be no reason to assume that this
optimism is irrational (even if it might in fact turn out to be wrong).
It should be noted that one of the arguments that another liberta-
rian makes about social engineering - Robert Nozick's claim that
market behavior cannot be stamped out - is rather beside the point
here. Nozick argues that it is pointless to use government to try to
achieve a "patterned distribution" of assets (such as wealth equality)
because as soon as the pattern is established, it will shortly be upset
through voluntary transactions. 29 The coerced transition to the pat-
terned distribution is never completed, for continued government in-
tervention is necessary to maintain the preferred pattern. But it is
far less plausible that the transition period will never be over in the
achievement of a race-blind society. Once a factor is seen as virtually
irrelevant, only a very strong impetus will work to revitalize the dis-
tinction. The problem with the racial dynamic is that it requires pa-
tience, forbearance, and generosity to diminish, not that once it
virtually disappears it can emerge full blown at any time. Tolerance
is self reinforcing.
These are surely matters on which reasonable people might differ.
There are people on both the left and the right who assume that
racial prejudice is ineradicable. Estimates of the cost are likely to
vary even among those who find the goal of equality desirable and
achievable. We do not have to be one hundred percent certain that a
statute will be successful - at a low cost - before it becomes ra-
tional to adopt it. The argument here is a modest one, namely that
the decision to try to move to a relatively race-blind society through
the adoption of antidiscrimination law is a reasonable one, with
which some people might in good faith disagree, but not patently
irrational.
This is a rather tepid recommendation. But it is all that is re-
quired unless the adoption of Title VII somehow violates other con-
straints. At this point, we need to return to the possible philosophical
foundations for Epstein's complaints. For it is possible that a deci-
sion to try to move toward a race-blind society might be within the
bounds of minimum rationality, but nonetheless indefensible. To in-
vestigate these possibilities, we need to examine the impact of the
three possible philosophical foundations on the adoption of antidis-
crimination law.
29. NOZICK, supra note 12, at 160.
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IV. THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELEVANCE OF CONSENSUS
The relevance of the fact that Title VII is so widely approved de-
pends upon the precise philosophical basis for Epstein's attack. If
Epstein's main complaint is utilitarian then one response is in order;
the libertarian and freedom of contract theories require different re-
sponses. The problem with the first sort of objection to antidis-
crimination law is that virtually universal approval tends to show
that antidiscrimination policy advances utility. The problem with the
second is that it is hard to discern whose liberty is infringed if most
people do not want to discriminate anyway. The problem with the
third is that freedom of contract is infringed only if there are at least
two people who want to have a discriminatory contract that the law
prevents; it is far from clear how many people there are with such
preferences.
A. Utilitarianism
At first blush, it seems unlikely that a legal principle that is as
widely approved - as Epstein claims that the antidiscrimination
principle is - would be inefficient. There are, of course, some parts
of our antidiscrimination law that are not nearly so popular; affirma-
tive action is highly controversial, of course, and it is arguable that
the disparate impact theory of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.30 is also
(although few lay people probably know about it.) But Epstein does
not limit his criticism to these controversial provisions; he proposes
to do away with antidiscrimination law in its entirety and would al-
low blatant displays of employer bigotry.3 1 I am taking him at his
word, and focusing on this part of his proposal, what I have been
calling the "core" of antidiscrimination law.
Epstein believes that this approval is misguided because it over-
looks the many substantial costs that antidiscrimination law imposes;
expenses for litigating Title VII cases, foregone efficiency gains from
workplace segregation, and the like. 2 He also doubts the positive
value of Title VII, and thus in his view the costs clearly outweigh the
benefits.3 3 How is it possible for his "guesstimate" about the effi-
ciency gains of Title VII to be so different from popular opinion?
30. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
31. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 68 (defending decisions based on ill
will); id. at 86-87.
32. See, e.g., id. at 242-66 (describing costly consequences of Title VII).
33. Id. at 27.
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The reason for the divergence lies, in large part, in the fact that he
chooses to discount many of the preferences that people in fact have
about the society in which they live, and about its legal structure.
Epstein apparently attaches little, if any, positive value to either in-
tegration or equality. If he did, he would have to consider whether
these values were worth the costs that (in his view) antidiscrimina-
tion law imposes. But it is quite clear that many (in fact, probably
most) people would prefer to live in a society that was more nearly
race blind. That is why antidiscrimination law is widely approved. I
asked earlier whether it was conceivable that someone would prefer
to move to A rather Z, on the grounds that A was much more ra-
cially equal. Whether it is conceivable or not, the fact is that many
people actually do.
Similarly, Epstein fails to consider the preferences that we actu-
ally have about not being discriminated against. Epstein brushes
aside the injury that someone experiences when he or she is discrimi-
nated against, saying that one can keep on hunting for a job, and
will eventually find a job with the employer that most values his or
her skills. But the injury one suffers from discrimination is not sim-
ply the injury of not getting one's first choice job (although that may
be part of it.) Even if one had an outstanding job offer from a per-
fectly comparable second employer, which one accepted instantane-
ously on being discriminated against by the first, one might still feel
the pain of discrimination. This is not a cost that Epstein bothers to
take into account.
Of course, the reason that Epstein fails to take such "injuries"
into account may be that he thinks they are simply silly. The person
(black or white) who cares about equality per se, or the person who
is hurt by the fact of discrimination over and above being denied a
job, is just being psychologically ultra-sensitive. Many people who
support antidiscrimination laws do so only out of some misplaced lib-
eral baggage that they would do better to shed immediately. What
really matters (Epstein perhaps thinks) is dollars and cents, not get-
ting your feelings hurt or being offended by racial inequality. 34 One
gets the impression that the last thing Epstein would want to do
would be to take into account, in any way, the actual misguided do-
gooder motivations people had in adopting Title VII and in continu-
ing to elect politicians that support the antidiscrimination principle.
But Epstein cannot consistently give this reason for discounting
such preferences while simultaneously criticizing other academics
34. Note that the fact that some injury is itself not monetary does not mean that
monetary compensation is inappropriate. Nonphysical injuries are often compensated
monetarily, for example by damages for pain and suffering.
HeinOnline  -- 31 San Diego L. Rev. 118 1994
[VOL. 31: 105. 1994] Lonely Libertarian: One Man's View
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
who have their own view of what preferences it is "proper" for peo-
ple to have. He takes some shots at Cass Sunstein, for instance, for
suggesting that Title VII might be defended as a governmental effort
to reshape private preferences along more egalitarian lines.35 Who
gave academics the right, asks Epstein, to tell ordinary people what
preferences to have? 6 Good question. If Epstein is going to ground
his attack on antidiscrimination law on utilitarian foundations, he
ought to be willing to take into account the preferences that people
have without passing judgment on them. He who would live by con-
sumer sovereignty must be prepared to die by consumer sovereignty.
Typically, people's attitudes towards rules of law are intimately
bound up with the value judgments they make. They have opinions
on what states of affairs are desirable, what they estimate the costs
of achieving these states of affairs to be, and how they balance the
gains, losses, and risks. Utilitarianism, as Epstein acknowledges,
adopts a subjective theory of value that takes preferences at face
value. Epstein may believe that our current preferences reflect de-
cades of indoctrination into the supposed value of antidiscrimination
law (and it may be true that the law is more widely accepted now
than it was when it was first adopted). But this is no more a reason
for disregarding them than the fact that our earlier preferences
were, in part, a product of the social and legal situation that existed
then. Epstein, I would imagine, does not want to delve into what he
believes to be our preferences to be with members of our own ethnic
group - preferences that some leftists would be happy to brand as a
product of capitalist brainwashing. He should extend the same cour-
tesy to preferences that happen not to coincide with his own view of
the world.
There are two evident objections to this argument that Title VII is
utility enhancing. 8 The first is that it seems to suggest that any stat-
ute popular enough to get passed must be acceptable to a utilitarian;
35. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, 150-51.
36. Id. at 151.
37. If I were to decide to go into the business of telling people what preferences to
have (and utilitarian theory does not invite this line of inquiry), I think that I would at
least try to espouse preferences that I felt were morally defensible - and Sunstein's
seem more appealing than Epstein's.
38. Note that I am not making the strong claim that our current regime is the very
best that might be done, only the weaker claim that it is better than what Epstein pro-
poses, given the preferences that we currently have. In this sense, one might say that our
current regime does not "satisfy" utilitarianism because some other regime would be
even more Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
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utilitarianism would have no critical bite. The second is that if an-
tidiscrimination law is as popular as Epstein and I claim, then why
do we need a statute prohibiting discrimination? There are easy an-
swers to both of these questions in the standard economics literature.
Economists need not, of course, assume that any bill that makes it
into law is for that reason efficient. Far from it; there are many eco-
nomic criticisms of statutes. But economists do need to offer some
explanation why something popular enough to get through the legis-
lative process nonetheless does not promote efficiency. There are sev-
eral possible answers, all eminently familiar. One might be that the
bill is popular with a majority of the voters, but imposes extremely
high costs on the minority. If the costs on the minority are high
enough, then they will outweigh the benefits to the majority. But a
majority will still approve, and the bill will get passed. This is an
argument about the distributional consequences of the legislation.
Another is that a small group of people who would be benefitted
by the rule are sufficiently centrally situated in the political process
that they can promote their legislation, even though it hurts the ma-
jority. This can happen even in a democracy, either through glitches
in the political process (something in the committee structure of
Congress that is antidemocratic) or because the small group of peo-
ple care much more intensely about the consequences than a large
group who stand to gain or lose only a small amount per person. It is
easier to organize small groups of intensely interested persons be-
cause small groups have fewer "free rider" problems. The small
group, through its superior organization and motivation, is then able
to "capture" the legislative process.
These are probably the two best-known explanations for why legis-
lation might be inefficient. But the distributional and capture expla-
nations do not do much good in the antidiscrimination context.
Support for antidiscrimination law seems (at least currently) to be
fairly broad based. Both theories require that there be some minority
which is more intensely interested in the question than the median
voter; presumably this would be members of minority groups. But
one can hardly describe this group as having captured the legislative
process to the detriment of the majority (as the second theory would
require.) Minorities are just not politically powerful enough for this
to be credible.39 And the first theory - the majority imposing seri-
ous costs on a powerless minority - does not explain the legislation
either. If anything, this description fits the state of affairs prior to
the adoption of Title VII, in which minorities were discriminated
against.
39. Another, perhaps, might be a cabal of liberal public interest types?
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So the claim that the popularity of Title VII shows that it is util-
ity enhancing does not lead to the unacceptable conclusion that all
statutes are utility enhancing. It recognizes that the democratic pro-
cess produces inefficient results in some cases; it is just that Title VII
seems not to be one of them. The second objection to meet is that if
Title VII is in fact so popular, then why do we need civil penalties to
enforce it? If we all condemn discrimination, then we can eradicate
discrimination by simply all refusing to discriminate. Conversely, the
fact that we do seem to need a statute suggests that it is not really so
popular, and perhaps therefore not utility enhancing.
The obvious answer to this objection points to collective action
problems. While we might all be better off in the long run if there
was no discrimination, each of us may in the short run be tempted to
cheat. Perhaps, for instance, one employer believes that women are
more likely to quit to have children, or that minority youths are
more likely to have undiscoverable arrest records. Or perhaps one's
current workforce would prefer that the employer hire people just
like them. "Why take the chance?" wonders the self-interested em-
ployer. Once we make the transition from Z to A, these inferences
would not be "rational" even in the short run, because race would
have no predictive value. But we are never going to make the transi-
tion if everyone is free to discriminate; everyone will prefer that "the
other guy" be the one to pay the transition costs of moving to a race-
blind society.
In one sense, discrimination problems call particularly strongly for
collective solutions. Some other sorts of employment relations
problems might be solvable on a case-by-case basis, with each
worker paying for the level of protection that he or she prefers. For
example, if a worker prefers to work in a smoke-free environment, or
one offering a better medical plan, then he or she could arguably
negotiate an employment contract offering this package of benefits.40
But it is not possible for the individual black worker to pay the em-
ployer not to discriminate against him. Imagine that whites are all
paid ten dollars an hour, and the black applicant is offered only nine.
It will not solve the problem for the black to somehow offer the em-
ployer one dollar an hour to be paid the same ten dollars an hour as
40. I am taking no stand on either the practicality or ethical desirability of impos-
ing this burden on workers; my point is simply that individually tailored agreements
might, at least in theory, be available in such circumstances.
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the whites. The black, obviously, would still (justifiably) feel dis-
criminated against.41 Collective action is necessary because the ob-
jective is that people from different ethnic groups should be treated
the same; upgrading one's own status by itself will not do the trick.
Because of the strong popular preferences for equality of opportu-
nity, utilitarianism is not a promising weapon in the fight against
antidiscrimination law. But it is not clear that Epstein really wants
to hitch his wagon to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency anyway. In particular,
one suspects that it is too potent an argument for his taste, authoriz-
ing the government to do all sorts of utility enhancing things that
Epstein would find distasteful. Given his evident enchantment with
the more restrictive theories of legislation - theories such as liberta-
rianism and freedom of contract - his reliance on utilitarianism has
a somewhat opportunistic cast. Utilitarianism simply comes in handy
whenever Title VII appears to be vulnerable on efficiency considera-
tions. But utilitarianism is not where Epstein's heart is. No matter
how clearly Title VII satisfied the efficiency criterion, Epstein proba-
bly would not care a whit. So we have to turn to philosophical argu-
ments probably closer to the core.
B. Libertarianism
The reason that popularity poses such problems for a utilitarian
critique of antidiscrimination law is the utilitarian reliance on sub-
jective preferences. Utilitarianism just takes subjective preferences
as they stand, totes them up, and evaluates the state of the world
accordingly. Utilitarianism, in addition, takes into account the pref-
erences of all people, no matter how remote they are, if they have
experienced the consequences. If Epstein wants to critique a popular
piece of legislation, he's better off using some philosophical theory
less sensitive to popular opinion. Libertarianism and freedom of con-
tract both seem promising because they appear to be more insulated
from popular preferences. Both seem to have a greater capacity to
invalidate actions based on preferences (such as a preference for
equality) that people actually have. Libertarianism and freedom of
contract tend to focus solely on the parties to governmental regula-
tion, excluding from consideration the preferences of strangers to the
transaction.42 The wide preferences of the population as a whole -
41. This is why it is pointless to suggest that the black applicant could "solve" the
problem by upgrading her qualifications. Even if the applicant could thereby get the job
she sought, she would still be discriminated against because she would need to have bet-
ter credentials to get the job than a white. As pointed out earlier, the injury of being
denied a job is different from the injury of being discriminated against.
42. There are some circumstances in which the interests of nonparties would be
relevant, such as if two individuals entered into an agreement to rob or attack a third
person. Such examples are not of much practical importance in the antidiscrimination
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and, thus, the popularity of a measure - are not important.
Yet libertarianism and freedom of contract do not get away en-
tirely from reliance on subjective preferences. Both theories, after
all, are voluntaristic. Both typically treat preference formation as ex-
ogenous, to be determined by the individual according to his or her
own tastes or even whims. The libertarian is as solicitous of the life
choices of the beer-swilling, pornography-reading jet-ski cowboy as
the bookish intellectual. The freedom of contract theorist would en-
force gambling contracts, cognovit clauses, and contracts to work for
less than the minimum wage, as well as individually dickered terms
between sophisticated parties of equal bargaining power.43 Both the-
ories have a role for subjective preference, and in both cases it is an
important one.
There is an obvious affinity between libertarian and freedom of
contract theories. We said earlier that libertarianism has more of a
negative rights focus - a focus on the right to be left alone - while
freedom of contract focuses on one's affirmative right that the state
enforce a contract into which one has freely entered. The character-
istic libertarian problem with antidiscrimination law, then, concerns
the individual who would prefer not to enter into the employment
contract (because he would rather not hire black people, or would
rather not hire them at the same wage as white people) but who is
compelled to do so by law. The most characteristic freedom of con-
tract problem concerns the person who would like to enter into a
discriminatory contract but is unable to do so.
Libertarianism, roughly speaking, focuses on the rights of white
people. Antidiscrimination law does not impinge on the rights of
black people because they are never required to enter into a contract
that they do not like. They cannot be sued for failing to apply for a
job, or failing to take one that is offered. 4 When libertarians com-
plain about antidiscrimination law, then, they have in mind the
rights of people that antidiscrimination law restrains, and these are
by and large members of the dominant group in society. Freedom of
context, and are not the focus of Epstein's analysis.
43. Note that some may draw the line, however, at contracts to sell oneself into
slavery.
44. Note, however, that a black person could be required by law to enter into a
contract with (say) a woman or an Asian. I do not consider these extra permutations
because for purposes of exposition I am focusing on the simplest case, where there are
only two groups - white and black. In addition, a black could be sued for discriminating
against other blacks. Setting these complications aside, the general point remains: Title
VII protects members of disfavored groups, and the libertarian argument rejects that
focus, shifting the balance back.
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contract arguments have a different focus. In theory, they uphold the
contract rights of all people who want to enter into discriminatory
contracts. As a rhetorical matter, however, freedom of contract theo-
rists tend, as Epstein does, to assert that the ability to contract (even
at a discriminatory rate) helps the disadvantaged group. This stance
is rhetorically attractive because it is designed to show that liberal
policy backfires; it hurts the very people it was designed to help.
But even though libertarianism and freedom of contract tend to
focus on rather different groups of people, they are still designed to
protect the subjective -preferences of these people. They are not
designed for, and they are not effective in, arguing that people
should change the preferences that they have or that government
should attempt to cause people to change them. It is for this reason
that popularity poses a problem for libertarian and freedom of con-
tract theory as well as for utilitarianism.
So let us start with libertarian theory. To the extent that core an-
tidiscrimination norms are widely held it seems that people do not
attach a very high value to the right to refuse to deal with people on
the basis of their race. Of course, as already noted, there are some
areas outside the core of antidiscrimination law that are quite con-
troversial. Perhaps some people highly prize their right not to prac-
tice affirmative action. In addition, there are some areas of life that
we consider so intimate that we do not want the government involved
even if its purpose is to prevent discrimination. Few people want the
government to choose with whom they will have dinner, with whom
they will share an apartment, or with whom they will have sex. We
apparently feel differently about with whom we will be in the army,
whom we will take on as students, and whom our colleagues will be.
Or, at least, most of us do.
Now what about the rest? This is where the libertarian argument
seems to gain momentum, for it concerns itself with the rights of
particular people to the specific transaction, rather than with what
the vast bulk of the populace prefers. If the liberties of specific indi-
viduals are violated, this is adequate basis for criticism even if every-
one else approves. So we need only locate some members of the
dominant group who choose not to enter into contracts with blacks
(or, not to enter into contracts with blacks on the same terms as
whites) and the libertarian argument is back in business.
Libertarians might at this point be tempted simply to point to the
fairly large numbers of Title VII defendants as evidence for the fact
that some whites prefer not to deal with blacks. But this will not do.
First, as already noted, this discussion focuses on core Title VII vio-
lations - litigation over affirmative action and disparate impact is
beside the point. We should also not assume that all Title VII de-
fendants did discriminate. Some of them are found innocent, after
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all. But there are still some white defendants who lose their cases,
who are guilty of core violations, and who clearly were attempting
not to hire blacks on the same terms as whites. (And as any member
of a disadvantaged group could surely tell you, there are other dis-
criminatory employers out in the field who never get dragged into
court because the proof problems are insurmountable.) So what
about these folks?
The strongest version of the libertarian argument, undoubtedly, is
the one that focuses on them. But even here we have problems. Com-
pare the prohibition against discrimination to prohibitions that liber-
tarians clearly approve, such as those on force, fraud, or breach of
contract.4 5 Obviously, defendants in assault, fraud, or breach of con-
tract actions must all be dragged kicking and screaming into court.
They clearly do not like the law at the point that they are caught
violating it. The fact that imposing a legal remedy violates the de-
fendant's liberty is not relevant; and neither is the fact that at the
time of the violation, the defendant chose to disregard the law. Obvi-
ously, some impingements on liberty are acceptable to libertarians.
Why is the prohibition on discrimination different from the prohibi-
tion on fraud?
Epstein apparently believes that the difference is that discrimina-
tion does not harm people because they are left free to go to another
employer. He claims that assault or theft leaves you in a worse posi-
tion than if there had been no interaction, while discrimination just
leaves you in the same place - jobless.46 But as already noted, this
claim manifests a fundamental misunderstanding about the grava-
men of the complaint. The complaint is not merely that you did not
get a job. It's that you were discriminated against. Even if you were
offered your dream job by another employer on the very next day,
you would still experience the sting of discrimination.47
45. Recall that Epstein does not list contract enforcement as a legitimate goal of
government; he lists only prohibitions on force or fraud. See supra note 11. I add con-
tract enforcement, however, because without it his freedom of contract argument makes
little sense.
46. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 30.
47. It is a different question whether money damages should be awarded in such a
case. We might choose not to award damages on the grounds that the law cannot accu-
rately measure the psychological harm; thus, where the second job paid as well, we could
find discrimination but deny monetary relief. But this does not mean that the law could
not if it wanted to provide recovery. If the absence of measurable monetary damages
meant that there was no harm, and if this were thought fatal by libertarians, then there
could be no money damages in many rape cases; indeed, it would mean that many rapes
(or other assaults not necessitating medical care) could not be criminally punished.
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Not offering a job seems like a simple failure to extend a benefit;
because discrimination occurs in the context of a failure to act, it
seems inactionable under a libertarian system. But the fact that it
occurs in this context does not mean that it is for that reason beyond
the government's reach. If I decide to shoot every student who ap-
plies unsuccessfully for a job as my research assistant, I cannot de-
fend myself on the grounds that I merely failed to offer them the
job. If I badger them and deliberately humiliate them until they are
driven from my office in tears (and then publish accounts of the in-
terviews in the student newspaper, causing them all to have nervous
breakdowns), I have surely done more than refuse to extend some
benefit that they desired. The fact that some other professor may
subsequently hire one or all of them at the same pay does not really
set things right.
Of course, Epstein might claim that it is very foolish of people to
be bothered by discrimination if they are able to get a comparable
job the very next day. This response, though, would manifest a will-
ingness to instruct us on what our preferences ought to be, which
would be unseemly for someone who criticizes colleagues for doing
just that.48 How, then, is a libertarian to determine which harms to
others can be prohibited by tort or criminal law?49 Epstein's discus-
sion of fraud, conclusory as it is, is instructive:
The standard prohibition against force and fraud does not depend on a sim-
ple assertion that killing or murder is just illegitimate. Rather, it rests on
the powerful, albeit empirical, judgment that all people value their right to
be free from coercion far more than they value their right to coerce others
in a Hobbesian war of all against all. The prohibition ex ante is therefore
thought to work to a (well-nigh) universal advantage.50
When one applies this standard to core discrimination, the parallel
is self evident. The standard prohibition against discrimination does
not depend (merely) on a simple assertion that discrimination is just
illegitimate. Rather, it (also) rests on the powerful, albeit empirical,
judgment that people value their right to be free from discrimination
far more than they value their right to discriminate against others.r1
48. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 304.
49. This is of course a classic problem in liberal political philosophy. See 1 JOEL
FEINBERG, THE MODEL LImITs OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS (1984).
50. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 75. He then goes on to say, "But there
are no similar universal gains from a rule that says people who have distinct and distaste-
ful preferences cannot go their own way by working and associating only with people of
similar views." Id. This is a complete red herring. Antidiscrimination law does not re-
quire people to work with other people of distinct and distasteful preferences. It prohibits
choice on the basis of race, sex, and other prohibited criteria. That is why it is so widely
approved.
51. Epstein is probably wrong to eliminate moral judgments entirely from the mo-
tivation behind the laws against murder. If we thought some conduct completely justifia-
ble, then we would probably want to reconsider the simple desire to penalize it because
we happen not to like it - even (no, especially) under a libertarian theory.
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If there is anything that is clear, it is that people do not like to be
discriminated against. White males are no exception, as the fierce
debates over affirmative action and the reverse discrimination suits
amply testify. Under Epstein's view, it all boils down to what we
happen to care about. And this explains the relevance of the popular-
ity argument to libertarian theory, and the relevance of subjective
preferences. It is not that a majority of the population likes Title
VII, but that the vast majority of the population prefers to give up a
not-very-highly-valued freedom to discriminate, and to receive in ex-
change a right to live free of discrimination for themselves and their
fellow citizens.
The last chance to save this libertarian argument against Title VII
might rest on a claim that laws against force and fraud are univer-
sally favored, while laws against discrimination are somewhat less
widely approved. There are more dissenters, in other words, and it is
the dissenters that libertarianism favors. Here we run into some
problems. There's fraud and there's fraud. It is not all the same, and
it is not all universally condemned. Securities fraud, for instance, is
viewed differently in some quarters from defrauding frail widows of
their life savings. Epstein at various points seems to think that there
is something special about fraud, per se.51 But at other points it
seems just to be a matter of what happens to be universally disap-
proved - in which case it would all boil down to a question of popu-
lar opinion. And even with regard to force, there are differences of
opinion on what ought to be condemned. There are people who do
not take rape very seriously at all, especially if the woman "asked
for it." Can it be prohibited because it is "force"? Or must it be
permitted because some individuals value their right to rape more
than their right to be free from rape?53 We should be wary of as-
suming too quickly that prohibitions on violence are valuable to all.
The Somali warlords are doing pretty well for themselves - they do
not need the intervention of a United Nations police force, thank
you. There are always some who stand to benefit more from anarchy
and violence than from establishment or restoration of order.
This is a familiar complaint against libertarianism. Exactly how
52. At least that would explain why he singles out force and fraud as the basis for
government coercion. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 4, 19.
53. Recall that although most victims of rape are women, not all are. A man does
give up something when he gives up his right to be free of rape, although it is clearly of
less value than the woman's right to be free of rape. In this sense, discrimination is
comparable, for the right of a white male not to be discriminated against is less valuable
than the right of a black woman not to be discriminated against.
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unanimous does approval of government action have to be?54 Why
should prohibitions on force or fraud be adopted without universal
approval? Can a single dissenter grind the legislative processes to a
halt? Even apparently clear examples of legitimate regulations, such
as the prohibition on murder, have their controversial aspects, such
as whether to permit an insanity defense or whether abortion may be
criminalized. Unanamity just isn't possible. Even libertarians are not
willing to place the power to make or break a piece of legislation in
the hands of the last remaining hold out. This is a point to which we
will return at the conclusion. Before that, however, we must consider
the final remaining basis for rejecting Title VII: freedom of contract.
C. Freedom of Contract
Although Epstein styles himself a libertarian, there are respects in
which his arguments sound more in freedom of contract. When he
writes eloquently of the ways minorities suffer from their legal disa-
bilities preventing entrance into discriminatory contracts, he is not
making an argument for the "nightwatchman" state, but a call for
affirmative governmental action. Libertarianism is a broad and com-
plete political theory about a wide range of things that government
should not get itself involved with. Freedom of contract is a much
more specific argument about a particular right which government
has an affirmative obligation to support; namely, the right to enter
into legally enforceable voluntary agreements.
But who is he protecting? So far as I am aware, few if any blacks
are demanding the right to enter into discriminatory agreements.
One hesitates to make sweeping generalizations, but I have become
disheartened in my search for counterexamples.55 It is interesting, in
this respect, to compare the way in which the freedom of contract
argument works in other contexts. It is possible to find women who
want to challenge women's protective legislation (maximum hour
laws, for example) because there are women that find such laws dis-
advantageous. 56 But these, of course, were laws that discriminated
against women. It is a lot harder to find blacks or women who want
to challenge a law that says that they have to be hired on equal
terms. Epstein is straining to protect a "right" that the "owners" are
happy to waive.
This argument, of course, leaves the rights of white employers out
54. See, e.g., IAN SHAPIRO, THE EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY 151-
203 (1986) (criticizing Nozick).
55. Epstein, no doubt, will come up with some.
56. Cf. Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). There
may also be workers who want to challenge prohibitions on nonunion contracts.
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of the picture. It is rhetorically understandable that Epstein's argu-
ments focus on the legal disabilities to blacks, but as a theoretical
matter the argument is symmetric. Whites, also, are prohibited from
entering into contracts that discriminate against blacks, and perhaps
this presents a freedom of contract problem. Some whites might
want to; is this a problem?5 7 Probably not, for it takes two to con-
tract as well as to tango. The employer has no abstract right to a
contract with anyone at a discriminatory wage. If no one wants to
contract with him or her, then freedom of contract provides no rem-
edy at all. If no blacks want to be hired on discriminatory terms, in
other words, the employer has no "freedom of contract" complaint.
For a freedom of contract problem to exist, there must be two
willing individuals who would voluntarily enter into a contract if the
law did not prohibit their chosen terms. This is precisely what the
popular support for Title VII renders improbable. Again, subjective
preferences enter the picture. Freedom of contract attaches a high
priority to the preferences people actually possess. It is theoretically
possible that Epstein is correct that women and minorities would be
much better off if they would swallow their pride and accept a job at
lower wages. Until they come to thirst for the objectively valuable
opportunity to be discriminated against, however, freedom of con-
tract theory cannot tell them that a preference for Title VII is mis-
guided. In this regard, the freedom of contract challenge is more
difficult to mount than the libertarian one, for the former is defeated
if one can merely show that no blacks want the right to discrimina-
tory employment. This would probably be easier than showing that
no whites want the right to refuse to deal with blacks.
But surely, one might think, freedom of contract is offended by
the fact that this theoretical avenue is foreclosed, regardless of
whether they choose to pick up on it. Doesn't freedom of contract
require the widest possible latitude for contractual possibilities, even
if no person presently existing would want those terms? What about
the fact that many minorities might in fact accept such contracts in
at least some circumstances if Title VII did not exist? 58 Does this
57. Note that we have something of the same unanimity issue as with the discus-
sion of libertarianism, because it is not clear whether there are many white employers
that want this right (at least, that want it ex ante).
58. Of course, some might choose not to accept discriminatory terms. They might
instead prefer to work at a different and overall less desirable job, on the theory that they
were at least not being discriminated against. According to the standard economic argu-
ments about such circumstances, this would displace some other worker, who would then
have to go to a lower rank to get a nondiscriminatory job, and so on down the ladder.
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show that the right to a discriminatory contract is a valuable which
should be preserved? How can it be fair for the government to step
in and prohibit a contract that the parties would make in the ab-
sence of legislation, even if it is a contract that one of the parties (in
some sense) does not want?
Here one must ask oneself why it is that a black would want the
government to prohibit a contract that he or she might voluntarily
enter into if no prohibition existed. The answer seems pretty clear.
First, it is possible that there is a general lack of confidence in the
black community about the alarming predictions some economists
make about the resulting decrease in jobs available to blacks. If so,
then blacks have nothing to lose by giving up the right to enter into
discriminatory agreements. People might also be forgiven for assum-
ing that once Title VII helped blacks to start entering the workforce,
their accomplishments would be appreciated and employers would be
willing to hire them in greater numbers. Better to hold out, then, for
jobs on equal terms even if there are a smaller number of them -
they would have an educational effect. 9 People might be willing to
take a risk that they will be the one to lose a job, because it would
promote the general well-being of the community.
Or, blacks might actually believe that the white community would
comply with the law, rather than resorting to subterfuge as Epstein
predicts. They might hope that the legal remedies that Title VII pro-
vides would afford some compensation to the injured party, and
would have some deterrent effect.60 Black people have apparently
felt, and still feel, that they are better off without the freedom to
enter into a discriminatory contract. Arguments that it can be strate-
gically sound to give up one's power to enter into a deal that one
does not want anyway are standard fare in the game theory litera-
ture."' Title VII in effect allows blacks to make a legally binding
waiver of the "right" to be discriminated against.
Now it might be proclaimed that even if it is strategically sound to
The minority who would have been at the very bottom of the ladder would then get
bumped off the bottom (there being nothing below, because of the minimum wage laws)
and so we would still get some individuals who would be denied a job by being unwilling
to work on discriminatory terms.
59. Note Epstein's argument on the educational effect on employers of familiarity
with particular black workers. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 263. If employers
are able to learn that particular blacks are worthy of employment, they are probably also
capable of learning that blacks, as a general matter, make good employees.
60. Epstein's argument would be equally at home in the criminal context, where
we could argue that it is unwise to prohibit bank robbery because people who really have
a taste for robbery will only switch over to muggings or white collar crime. Whatever the
empirical validity of such arguments - I know of no data - we typically choose not to
be blackmailed by the threat to commit some other ugly deed if the first is thwarted.
61. Compare the plight of the kidnap victim who is asked to make an enforceable
promise to pay the ransom. Does he or she want the power to make the promise?
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give up the power to enter into a discriminatory contract, the govern-
ment has no proper role in facilitating such a strategic choice. Here
the argument tips its hat to the libertarian approach, for one might
say that the "nightwatchman state" should not get involved in such
social engineering projects as facilitating the making of binding
waivers. The government should stick instead to the basic meat and
potatoes law - preventing force and fraud, and enforcing contracts.
But such an argument sits oddly with the basic freedom of contract
claim. A major objective of contract law is to give people the means
to make enforceable commitments for strategic purposes. Gains from
trade are possible if one can give up some of one's power, namely the
power to welsh on a deal voluntarily made. The commitment strat-
egy to give up the right to make discriminatory contracts seems little
different. Minorities are asking the government to take away a
power that they find strategically disadvantageous. They feel that
they will be better off overall without the dubious capacity to enter
into discriminatory agreements.62 Freedom of contract theories
should recognize the government's roles in empowering people this
way, particularly if there seem to be no minority individuals who
consider relinquishing the power to be a loss.
CONCLUSIONS
The soundest theoretical argument Epstein has is probably a liber-
tarian argument based on a unanimity (or near unanimity) require-
ment. Even if most white people are willing to give up the right to
hire only whites, a small number of dissenters (or a single dissenter)
can veto the law.
Unfortunately, this argument leaves us with few laws standing.
Prohibitions on force and fraud are not the exceptions Epstein thinks
they are. Once he opens the door to nonunanimity, there seems to be
no logical stopping point - what kind of super majority, precisely, is
required? Why is repression of even a single dissenter justifiable?
Why is force, fraud, or contract, different? But if he insists on una-
nimity, he is unlikely to have many followers.
The libertarian argument proves too much for most people's tastes
and political beliefs. It threatens to invalidate not only the New
Deal-type laws that Epstein so dislikes, but government funding of
roads and schools. If the bottom line of Epstein's book is that Title
62. Note that they can still work under discriminatory terms; it is just that they
cannot effectively promise their discriminating employers that they will not later sue.
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VII is no more defensible than (gasp!) the federal highway program,
. . . well, I can live with that.
It is hard to know exactly how many people would like to get rid
of the core prohibitions of Title VII. So far, the antidiscrimination
principle seems to be holding as a moral consensus, and most of us
seem to think that it is of long range practical value as well. I do not
have the numbers, but it does not seem that I need them, given that
Epstein himself starts out with the premise the Title VII is widely
(almost universally) popular. Except for Epstein, how many people
are complaining? He should perhaps get to work on the rather uphill
battle of trying to persuade private individuals to change their beliefs
that racial discrimination is wrong. It is lonely being a libertarian.
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